Empirical Analysis of an Augmented Schumpeterian Endogenous Growth Model by Udeogu, E. et al.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT                              53 





EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AN AUGMENTED SCHUMPETERIAN 
ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL 
 
 
EJIKE UDEOGU a, UZOCHUKWU AMAKOM b AND SHAMPA ROY-MUKHERJEE a  
 
a University of East London, United Kingdom 
b University of Nigeria, Nigeria 
 
 
This study conducts an empirical analysis of an augmented Schumpeterian endogenous 
growth theory using aggregate-level data from 1981 to 2017 for 31 OECD countries. Despite 
a considerable number of studies analysing endogenous growth, cross-country analyses 
utilising estimators robust to endogeneity-bias and controlling for the macroeconomic effect 
of institutions are still rare. In this paper, we employ a relatively consistent estimator to 
analyse an augmented neoclassical production function that links output per worker to 
capital accumulation, technological progress, and institutions. Our results from the extended 
system of generalised method of momentS estimation align with the mainstream consensus 
that capital accumulation and technological progress or innovation, in the form of R&D 
activities, determine the level of output per worker in the long run. But in addition, we find 
that effective institutions underlie the innovation effect. On average, the impact of R&D 
activities on output per worker is higher in countries with more effective institutions. 
 
Keywords: Endogenous Growth Theory, Capital Accumulation, Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM), Institutions, Neoclassical Production Function, OECD, 
Research & Development, Technical Progress 
JEL Classification: O11, O30, O47, O57 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the neoclassical growth theory, the long-run rate of economic growth, 
as measured by the growth rate of output per worker, is induced by labor productivity, 
which is largely determined by the rate of technological progress (Solow, 1956 and 
1957). In turn, the technological progress is contended to be exogenously determined by 
a scientific process that is separate from, and independent of, economic forces. This 
implies that, in the long run, economic growth does not depend on economic conditions. 
In particular, a country’s long run growth is assumed unaffected by purposeful economic 
policy.   
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Contrarily, the endogenous growth theorists argued that long-run growth rate is 
influenced by ‘endogenous’ outcome of the conscious actions of economic agents. The 
endogenous analyses start from the observation that technological progress takes place 
through innovations, which can take the form of new products, processes and markets. 
This implies, unlike the neoclassical conclusion, that economic activities that stimulate 
innovations can affect a country’s long run growth rate.  
Since its emergence, different versions of the endogenous growth theory have been 
propounded. To begin with, the AK theory, which was the first version of endogenous 
growth theory, contend that the accumulation of capital includes the accumulation of 
both physical and human or intellectual capital, without making an explicit distinction 
between capital accumulation and technological progress. Furthermore, it asserts that the 
aggregated production function can exhibit a constant or even increasing marginal 
product of capital, because when firms accumulate more capital, some of that increased 
capital will be the intellectual capital that creates technological progress, which is 
expected to offset the tendency for the marginal product of capital to diminish (e.g, 
Frankel, 1962; Uzawa, 1965; Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988).  
The second wave of endogenous theory consists of the “innovation-based” growth 
theory, which belonged to two parallel models: “the product variety” model of Romer 
(1990) and “the Schumpeterian model” by Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991). In the main, both of these models recognize that 
technological progress is distinct from physical and human capital. Accordingly, 
physical and human capital are noted to be accumulated through saving and schooling, 
while technological progress is seen to grow from purposeful activities that generate 
new ideas, methods and devices.  
According to the product variety model, inventions, in the form of new, but not 
necessarily improved, varieties of products is the technological progress that causes 
productivity cum economic growth (Romer, 1990). The Schumpeterian theory, on the 
other hand, focuses on quality-improving innovations that render old products obsolete, 
through the process that Schumpeter (1942) called ‘creative destruction’. The 
Schumpeterian paradigm relies on two main ideas. First is the idea that long-run growth 
relies on process innovation (due to the increase in the productivity of labor or capital), 
or product innovation (the introduction of new products), or organisational innovation 
(which is to make the combination of production factors more efficient). The second is 
the idea that innovations result from investments like research and development (R&D), 
firms’ investments in skills, and the search for new markets that are motivated by the 
prospect of monopoly rents for successful innovators. 
In all, according to the endogenous growth theories, the various economic activities 
that contribute to determining technological progress include increased investment in 
physical and human capital, investments in research and development, the extent of 
international openness, and several other determinants (e.g, Frankel, 1962; Uzawa, 1965; 
Romer, 1986, 1987, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998a, 
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1998b; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, 1991b, 1994)1.  
Although considerable progress has been made in the theoretical modelling of 
technical change or technological progress, the same could not be said of the empirical 
counterpart. Particularly, fewer cross-country empirical studies utilising macro panel 
data have been carried out in support of most of the endogenous growth theories 
proposed. Furthermore, a majority of the few aggregate-level studies that have been 
conducted have often tended to produce conflicting results and conclusions. For example, 
while some studies (see Mohnen, 1990; Mohnen and Lepine, 1991; Coe and Helpman, 
1995; Griliches, 1998; and Zachariadis, 2003) appear to show a statistically large 
significant relationship between technical progress (proxied either by R&D or patent 
stock or human capital proxies such as years of schooling or gross secondary school 
enrolment rates) and output growth (or productivity, in some cases), many have also 
produced contradictory results (e.g. Jones, 1995; Bilbao-Osorio and Rodrigues-Pose, 
2004; Hall et al., 2009).  
In all, the contrasting results in the empirical literature on endogenous growth have 
mostly been attributed to the difficulty inherent in the measurement of technological 
progress (Griliches, 1998; Hall et al., 2009). Without a doubt, a misspecified or 
inadequately measured technological progress means the likely omission of a relevant 
determinant in a model. And as observed by Blundell and Bond (2000), Blundell, Bond 
and Windmeijer (2000), the omission of a relevant variable in a model tend to lead to 
inconsistent output from traditional panel estimators.  
This paper contributes to the existing knowledge in two-ways. First, we contribute to 
the growing empirical literature by utilising an estimator that has been shown to be 
robust, especially when endogeneity bias - caused by the omission of relevant variables 
or an error in the measurement of the variable or due to simultaneous causality between 
the dependent and independent variables - is likely to be present in the empirical model 
to analyse an augmented endogenous growth theory. Second, unlike previous studies, we 
also control for the potential effect of relative institutions. We posit that the inability of 
studies to account for the effect of relative institutional arrangement contributes to the 
inconsistencies of the empirical results on endogenous growth.  
Furthermore, similar to North (1990), we also contend that the failure to account for 
the macroeconomic effect of institutional structures leads to inadequate analysis of the 
underlying determinants of the long-run performance of economies. So, not only does 
the omission of institutional variables lead to inconsistencies in empirical analysis but 
also to incomplete analysis of fundamental factors affecting economic growth in the 
long run.  
To summarise, in this study, we utilise an estimator that is robust to endogeneity 
-bias to examine an augmented- Schumpeterian endogenous growth theory that builds on 
the original Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by Aghion and Howitt (1998a, b). 
 
1 See Barro (1997) for a more detailed discussion of the seminal exogenous and endogenous growth 
theories.  
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We define our augmented-Schumpeterian model as an amalgamation of the AK, 
Schumpeterian, and institution-based growth theories that emphasizes the effect of 
capital (both physical and human) accumulation, R&D expenditure or, more broadly, 
innovation-inducing-activities, and institutional arrangements on output or economic 
growth. Our empirical analysis uses an extensive macro panel data of 31 OECD 
countries from 1981-2017. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two contains a critical review 
of some related empirical literature on empirical endogenous growth. Section three 
includes discussions on the macroeconomic role of institutions. Session four presents the 
data and methods used in this paper. Section five discusses the empirical results while 
section six provides the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  REVIEW OF SOME RELATED EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
The empirical framework mostly used in the endogenous growth study often follow 
the standard neoclassical production function (represented in Equation 1 below), where 
the dependent variable is a measure of output ( ) and the explanatory variable ( ) is 
a vector of standard economic inputs such as labour, capital, intermediate inputs and so 
forth, and technological progress ( ) is proxied by a variety of variables such as years 
of schooling or secondary school enrolment, R&D expenditure or patent counts, 
democracy or other institutional measures. 
  
log = 	  	+ 	 (log ) 	+ 	 (log )	+ 	 .             (1) 
 
Equation (1), linear in the logarithms of the variables, have been used by Griliches 
(1980, 1986), Griliches and Mairesse (1983, 1984, 1990), Cuneo and Mairesse (1984), 
Mankiw et al. (1992), Barro (1995, 1999), Guellec and Potterie (2003), and Hall (2011), 
among a few others, to estimate the elasticity of output (or productivity) to factor inputs 
and some proxies of technological progress2.  
The alternative formulation, represented in Equation (2) below, replaces the levels 
with growth rates. 
 
∆ log 	= 	 (∆ log ) 	+ 	 (∆ log ) 	+	∆ .        (2) 
 
In this form, the rate of growth of output is related to the intensity (or the rate of 
change) of the explanatory variables. Several versions of the second equation have been 
estimated by Clark and Griliches (1984), Link (1981a, 1981b), Griliches (1986), 
Criscuolo and Haskel (2003) and Duguet (2006) using firm or line-of-business level data, 
 
2 Most of these studies follow the standard growth accounting approach of substituting   with real GDP 
per capita.  
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and by Scherer (1982, 1984), Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984a, 1984b), Griliches 
(1994), Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004) and Rogers (2010) using industry or national 
aggregates.  
In the main, most of these past studies have generally used cross-sectional data that 
does not allow for heterogeneity across countries - that is, the intercept is not allowed to 
be specific to individual countries - and the traditional Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimator to estimate the unknown parameters. However, given that there is strong 
evidence of parameter heterogeneity that may arise from non-linearities in the 
production function across countries (see the remarks by Liu and Stengos, 1999; 
Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001, for instance), the cross-sectional estimates that do not allow 
for cross-sectional heterogeneity could thus be seen as both inconsistent and biased. 
Equivalently, the likely existence of measurement errors in the variables and the 
possibility of a simultaneous causation between output (or output growth) and some of 
the factor inputs also biases the consistency of the OLS estimators (e.g, Arellano and 
Bover 1995; Griliches 1995, 1998; Aghion and Howitt 1998a, 1998b; Wooldridge, 2001; 
Bond et al., 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2019)3. In essence, the results of these past studies 
need to be interpreted with caution since the traditional estimators do not address the 
inherent endogeneity bias that results from variable measurement errors or simultaneity 
bias.  
To accommodate idiosyncratic individual effects, the error terms in Equations (1) 
and (2) have often been re-specified as a one-way error component model -Equation (3):  
 
  , 	= 	   	+	  ,  .            (3) 
 
Here,    is viewed as an individual fixed effect term that varies across entities 
(firms or countries) but not within entities over time, and   ,  is the usual white-noise 
error term. The fixed effect term    captures those idiosyncratic individual effects that 
do not vary over time (that is, the time-invariant factors), which are often elided in 
cross-sectional data. In this case, a ‘within-group’ panel estimator, a fixed effect (FE) or 
random effect (RE) technique, can be used to consistently estimate the unknown 
parameters, if longitudinal data are available. Nevertheless, the FE and the RE 
approaches have also been shown to be biased, especially if there are measurement 
errors in the variables (Griliches and Hausman, 1986; Baltagi, 2013).  
So, given that traditional technological progress proxies are prone to measurement 
errors due to the difficulty in accurately quantifying technical progress (e.g, Griliches, 
 
3 The main problem with quantifying technological progress, as Griliches pointed out, lies in the 
unavailability of a direct and relevant indicator that can adequately reflect the various complexities inherent 
in the process. The issue of timing and depreciation was also noted to contribute significantly to the 
measurement error. Similarly, future output and its profitability have been shown to depend on past 
R&D/investment, while present R&D/investment, in turn, also depends on both past income and the 
expectations about future income; thus, the simultaneity element. 
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1998), results, such as those obtained by Hall (1993), Hall and Mairesse (1995) and 
Harhoff (1998), that applied the within-group estimators also need to be interpreted with 
caution, because of the inherent bias of the within-group estimators when there are 
measurement errors in the variables.  
In the context of a dynamic panel model, characterized by the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors, Nickell (1981) showed that the within-group 
model would also be inconsistent and inefficient. The inconsistency with the one-way 
fixed effects model, particularly in a ‘small  , large  ’ context, is seen to arise because 
the demeaning process which subtracts the mean value of the dependent and 
independent variables from their respective levels (see Equation (4) below) creates a 
correlation between the regressors and the idiosyncratic error term, which then renders 
the within-group estimator inconsistent.  
 
  , −    =  (  ,   −    ,  ) +  (  , −    ) +  (  , −  ̅ ) + (  , −  ̅ ).      (4) 
 
Here, since   ,  is a function of   , ,   ,    is also a function of   , . Therefore, 
  ,   , a right-hand regressor in (4), will be correlated with the error term, thus rendering 
the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the   ,  are not serially correlated (e.g, 
Baltagi, 2013).  
So, although the fixed effects estimator addresses the issue of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity, the demeaned autoregressive variable (  ,   −    ,  , where    ,  =
∑   ,      /( –1) is observed to still be correlated with (  , −  ̅ ) even if the   , 	are 
not serially correlated. This is because, as Baltagi (2013) explained,   ,    will be 
correlated with  ̅  by construction: that is, the latter average contains (  ,   	which is 
obviously correlated with   ,   . Therefore, because of the correlation between a 
regressor and the error term in a within-transformed dynamic model, the fixed effect 
estimator is said to be biased and inconsistent in a panel where   is large and   is 
fixed. The only exception is if  → ∞. In this case, the within estimator of the unknown 
parameters for the dynamic error component model could be consistent. 
Often, in order to get a robust estimation of coefficients and standard errors when 
some variables could contain measurement errors, and there exist a correlation between 
regressors and the idiosyncratic error term, in the context of a finite   dynamic panel 
data, the ‘first-difference’ transformation proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), the 
‘long-difference’ approach by Griliches and Hausman (1986), or the difference GMM 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) have been used to study endogenous economic growth 
(see Li, 2002; Madsen, 2002; Bond et. al., 2003; Chen and Yang, 2005; Duguet, 2006; 
Jafferson et al., 2006; Parisi et al., 2006; Bond et al., 2010; Mairesse and Robin, 2010; 
Acemoglu et al., 2014, 2019).  
To begin with, the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested first differencing the model 
to get rid of the individual effect and then using the second lag of the differenced 
dependent variable (from our example, that is ∆  ,   =   ,   −   ,   ) or simply the 
second lag of the dependent variable (  ,   ) as an instrument for the autoregressive term 
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(∆  ,   =   ,   −   ,   ). According to these authors, the instruments are serially 
uncorrelated with the differenced error term (∆  , =   , –  ,   ), as long as the   ,  
themselves are not serially correlated. However, as pointed out by Ahn and Schmidt 
(1993), this type of instrument variable estimation leads to consistent but not necessarily 
efficient estimates of the parameters in the model because it does not make use of all the 
available moment conditions and also does not take into account the differenced 
structure on the residual disturbances. Equally, Arellano (1989) finds that for simple 
dynamic error component models the estimate that uses differences (such as the second 
lag of the differenced dependent variable) rather than their levels as instruments, have a 
singularity point and very large variances over a significant range of parameter values. 
On the other hand, Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that additional instruments can be 
obtained in a dynamic panel data if one utilizes the orthogonality conditions that exist 
between lagged level values of the dependent variable and the disturbances. To this end, 
they recommended the use of instruments in levels for differenced variables.  
The potential weakness with the Anderson-Hsiao and Arellano-Bond estimators was 
revealed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). It was shown that 
the lagged levels are poor instruments for first differenced variables, especially if the 
variables are close to a random walk. The Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) modification of the estimator include lagged levels as well as lagged 
differences in a system of equations that combines both level and differenced variables. 
This remodified approach is often referred to as a system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 
1998, 2000).  
To conclude, the system-GMM has been shown to produce consistent estimates 
when there appears to be an endogeneity bias in the model (e.g Blundell and Bond, 2000; 
Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer, 2000; Baum et al., 2003; Roodman, 2009). And as far 
as we know, only a handful of studies (for example Levine et al., 2000; Bond et al., 2001; 
and Griffith et. al., 2006) have attempted to utilise the robust extended sys-GMM 
estimator to control the statistical bias that arises from the endogeneity of regressors, 
which are often due to variable measurement errors, simultaneous causality or the 
omission of relevant variables. This study contributes to the growing literature on 
endogenous growth by utilizing the robust extended system-GMM estimator to analyse 
an augmented-Schumpeterian growth model that, unlike previous related studies, also 
accounts for the effect of institutional structures.  
 
 
3.  THE MACROECONOMIC ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
Although the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Douglas North, could be said to have 
brought to the fore the importance of institutions to economic development, the study of 
institutions and their effect on the economic processes could nevertheless be traced back 
to the works of scholars such as Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and John R. Commons 
(1862-1945).  
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Institutions, as broadly defined by North (1990, 1991), are the formal and informal 
constraints governing human behaviour. The informal constraints consist of sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct that evolve overtime, whereas the 
formal constraints include rules such as constitutions, the rule of law, and property  
rights. They are, as North puts it, generally “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North, 1990; p.4). Institutions can be further classified as 
socio-cultural, economic and political institutions, depending on the aspect of human 
interaction they structure.  
Broadly, the ability of institutions to reduce the cost of economic transaction is 
remarked to underlie its strategic importance to the long-run performance of economies. 
To begin with, the costliness of information is observed to be the key to the cost of 
economic transactions (which consists of the costs associated with banking, insurance, 
finance, wholesale, and retail trade; or, in terms of occupations, with lawyers, 
accountants, security services, etc.). The costliness of information derives from the 
asymmetric nature of available information - a situation where both parties involved in 
an economic transaction have an unequal amount of information (that is, one party 
knows much more than the other)4. In turn, the costs of transactions determine the 
valuable attributes of economic exchanges, since they form part of production cost. And 
when the cost of transactions that go through the market are high, due to the 
expensiveness of obtaining relevant economic information or because of the cost of 
having imperfect information, they invariably affect the productiveness of the economy. 
For example, if the cost of seeking redress against someone who has broken the law (say 
because of default on loan repayment) are high, and also if the organisations that provide 
the physical structures to the law (such as courts) are ineffective (biased or corrupt), the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of the rules (in this regard the appropriate punishment) 
diminishes. Consequently, the ineffectiveness of the institutional structure fosters 
discontent and distrust among the citizens, thus inhibiting productive exchanges - such 
as future loan/credits grants - capable of stimulating economic growth. 
In general, the essential part of the functioning of institutions is ascertaining 
violations of the community code of conduct and the severity of punishment. When it is 
not costly to ascertain violations of the rules of the game and to enforce appropriate 
punishment, the institutional arrangement is said to be effective. Subsequently, effective 
institutions create a sort of structure to human exchange by both incentivising productive 
human activities and disincentivising unproductive human activities. By spontaneously 
limiting the set of unproductive choices of individuals and organisations - such as 
nepotism, moral hazards, corruption, theft, and other nefarious activities - and providing 
 
4 For a background discussion on asymmetric information theory, see Akerlof, G. (1970), “The Market 
for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(1), 
488-500; Spence, M. (1973), “Job Market Signalling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374; 
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1976), “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the 
Economics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 626-649.  
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the framework within which productive human interaction or activities - such as 
collaborations, bank credits, etc - takes place, effective institutions systematically 
reduces the cost of economic transactions and redirect incentives that in turn direct 
individuals and organisations along productivity-increasing paths.  
Despite its obvious implication for long term economic performance, it is only just 
recently that studies examining the macroeconomic role of institutional arrangements 
have started to emerge. The modern exponents of the primacy of institutions include 
Dani Rodrik of Harvard University and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James 
Robinson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These scholars, collectively, 
have written extensively on the importance of effective institutions for economic growth 
and development. For instance, the central message of the path-breaking book by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Why Nations Fail, is that without inclusive economic 
and political institutions nations will fail to achieve meaningful economic development. 
Likewise, Rodrik (2000, 2004, 2008), Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), and Williamson 
(2009), have also asserted that institutions are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for 
rapid economic progress. Generally, there is a consensus among these development 
economists that those institutions that support markets (economic interactions and 
collaborations), such as those that enforce property rights and legally binding contracts, 
improve regulatory oversights, reduce conflicts, and constrain the political power of the 
elite cum corruption, are prerequisites for accelerating economic development.  
In this paper, we argue that the omission of institutions is also central to the 
inconsistencies observed in the empirical literature on endogenous growth. This is 
chiefly because innovative activities face several uncertainties that only the presence of 
an effective institution can help to ameliorate. For example, following the exposition by 
Schumpeter (1934), the knowledge necessary for entrepreneurial decisions are mostly 
unknown and costly to acquire and there is also the issue of inaccurate information or 
analysis of the economy, such as whether the outcome of the entrepreneurial decision 
(be it a product or process) would be economically viable. These uncertainties, it is 
remarked, naturally make innovation to be shrouded in ambiguity. Furthermore, the 
objective uncertainty is said to be compounded by subjective reluctance of individuals to 
strike out into the unknown, often because of fear of the antagonism of non-innovators 
to innovators - in the form of legal and political obstacles and intellectual property theft 
and the likes. Both objective and subjective uncertainties, Schumpeter concluded, 
contribute to the inhibition of innovative activities in an economy. An institution that 
could reduce these uncertainties through, for example, guarding against the theft of 
intellectual property, we contend, incentivises innovation and discoveries. In turn, the 
outcome of the innovations and discoveries gives firms the competitive advantage, 
thereby contributing to the augmentation of the individuals’ and the nation’s wealth. In 
essence, effective institutions are critical in fulfilling the purpose of inducing individuals 
– by way of reducing objective uncertainties and the subjective reluctance that arises due 
to fear of loss of intellectual property right and its ensuing private gain - to innovate or 
embark on new discoveries that subsequently stimulates growth in the long-run. In 
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essence, the inconsistencies in the empirical results could largely be due to the 
distinctiveness of institutional quality across countries.  
In summary, although ideas and ideologies matter, it is the institutions that play the 
major role in determining just how much they matter. In essence, although ideas and 
ideologies shape the subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the 
world around them and to make effective choices, by structuring the interaction of 
human beings in certain ways that ensures operational implementation of the ideas, 
institutions deliberately or accidentally affect the long run performance of the economy.  
 
 
4.  DATA AND METHODS   
 
Annual data from 1981 to 2017 were collected for 31 OECD countries, providing a 
37-year unbalanced5 panel. The estimation in this paper uses both annual data and data 
for non-overlapping three-year periods6. The data for estimating the specified model - 
Equation (5) were retrieved from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank Governance Indicators statistics databases. 
The data set includes annual series of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), total gross 
investment (gross fixed capital formation), the total employment figure, the gross 
expenditure on research and development and a proxy for institutions, in this case the 
rule of law estimates. All the variables are measured in constant international dollars, 
except the employment and rule of law figures7.  
For this study, we follow the traditional production function method of using 
economic output (the real gross domestic product per person employed (     ) in this 
case) as the dependent variable (e.g Barro et al., 2017, for instance). The gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) and the gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) were also divided 
by the employment figure to derive gross fixed capital per worker (      ) and research 
and development expenditure per worker (      ), respectively. Table 1 below 
contains the descriptive statistics of the averaged dataset. 
Our methodology builds on the Schumpeterian growth model developed by Aghion 
and Howitt (1998a, 1998b) and is similar to the Cobb-Douglas production function 
considered by Griliches and Mairesse (1998). The institutional element is supported by 
the theoretical works of Douglas North on institutional change and economic 
 
5 We have some missing variables for a number of countries that had no data for the gross expenditure on 
R&D (    ) and investment for some periods.  
6 To mitigate the bias that often arise from persistent series, we averaged the observations over a 
non-overlapping multi-year period. This approach is consistent with the standard practice of using averaged 
series (see, for instance, Bond et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2005; and Bond et al., 2010). The three-year 
average of each variable is computed as ([  +     +     ] ⁄ 3 , 	[    +     +     /3,…[      +
      +       /3). Averaging the series yielded 12-period non-overlapping observations for each variable.  
7 See A1 in the Appendix for the long definition of these variables and their sources.  




Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per person employed 356 60264.830 26588.090 16874.180 170013.900 
GFCF per person employed 356 13669.730 6164.758 3034.982 53362.210 
GERD per person employed 356 1299.319 825.361 81.879 3387.108 
Rule of Law 403 1.272 0.634 -0.619 2.100 
Source: Based on author’s own calculation.  
 
 
Table 2.  Lag Length Selection Criteria 
Lag CD J J p-value MBIC MAIC MQIC 
1 1.00 91.230 0.180 -303.530* -68.770* -164.170* 
2 1.00 79.220 0.100 -236.590 -48.780 -125.100 
3 1.00 55.340 0.220 -181.520 -40.660 -97.900 
4 1.00 41.950 0.110 -115.950 -22.050 -60.210 
Source: Based on author's own calculation.  
Note: *indicates the proposed optimal lag length by the models.  
 
 
The instrumental variables used in the analysis are the lags of the predetermined 
variable (that is, the lags of the dependent variable) and those of the explanatory 
variables, which we assumed to be endogenous8. Also, the empirical method utilises year 
dummies to control for common time effects. For our preferred model with 3-year 
averaged series, only one period lags of the dependent and independent variables are 
used. The consistent moment and model selection criteria (MMSC) proposed by 
Andrews and Lu (2001) for GMM models was used to select the lag length. The MMSC 
is analogous to most of the commonly used maximum likelihood-based model selection 
criteria such as the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (Akaike 1969), the Bayesian 
 
8 We assume a priori that both capital per worker (       , ), gross expenditure on R&D per worker 
(       , ), and the institutional proxy - the rule of law estimate - are potentially correlated with the 
country-specific effect (  ) and with the errors (  , ), as well as been imprecisely measured.  
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Information Criteria (BIC) (Akaike 1977; Schwarz 1978), and the Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criteria (HQIC). The MMSC models include the Moments of Bayesian 
Information Criteria (MBIC), the Moments of Akaike Information Criteria (MAIC) and 
the Moments of Hannan-Quin Information Criteria (MQIC) techniques9. The result of 
the moment and model selection criteria (presented in Table 2 below) suggest a 
first-order autoregressive model.   
To analyse the long-run relationship between the technology proxy (      ), 
capital accumulation (      ), the institutional proxy (rule), and output per worker 
(     ), we formulate the following autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) model, 
similar to that used by Blundell and Bond (2000), Levine et al. (2000), Bond et al. 
(2001), and Bond and et al. (2010), except with regards the technology proxy used as 
well as the inclusion of an institutional proxy in our model. In general, we revisit the 
Cobb-Douglas production function first considered by Griliches and Mairesse (1998), 
albeit with the inclusion of an institutional proxy. 
In sum, the following dynamic equation was considered:  
 
log(      , ) =  log(      ,   
) +   log(       , ) +   
log(       ,   ) 
+	  log(       , ) +   
log(       ,   ) 
+	  (     ,   ) +   +   +   , ,       (5) 
 
where    represents time effects,    denote the unobserved time-invariant 
country-specific effect and   ,  is the serially uncorrelated disturbance term. The 
subscripts   and   represent country and time period, respectively. The gross fixed 
capital formation per person employed and the gross expenditure on R&D per person 
employed are postulated to affect gross output per person employed both 
contemporaneously and with a lag. Rule of law, however, is assumed to affect output per 
person employed only with a lag; given that it takes time to instill confidence in the 
effectiveness of institutional structure or for institutional changes to affect the economy. 
The specification is later revised to include the institutional proxy as an interaction term 
with the technical change proxy. This latter specification we feel is more appropriate 
given that, as we have discussed earlier, institutions affect the economy indirectly 
through its impact on transaction costs and economic exchanges.  
The difference-GMM initially proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) involves 
first-differencing Equation (5) to eliminate the firm-specific effects and subsequently 
instrumenting with suitably lagged levels of the variables. The first-differenced equation 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
9 Abrigo and Love (2016) contain a brilliant summary of the Andrews and Lu (2001) moment and model 
selection criteria.  
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log(      , 
−       ,   
) =  [log(      ,   
) − log(      ,   
)] 
+	  [log(       , 
) − log(       ,   
)] 
+	  [log(       ,   
) − log(       ,   
)] 
+	  [log(       , 
) − log(       ,   
)] 
+	  [log(       ,   
) − log(       ,   
)] 
+	  (     ,   −      ,   ) + (  −     ) 
+	(  , −   ,   ).        (6) 
 
The standard GMM assumption on the initial conditions (of orthogonality) imply 
E[  , |  , ] = 0 for  = 2,… ,  . This yields the following conditions: 
 
E[  ,   |(  , −   ,   )] = 0  
for s	³	2 when   , ~ MA(0), and s	³	3 when   ,  ~ MA(1),     (7) 
where   ,  represents all the set of explanatory variables included in Equation (5), 
except the lagged logarithm of real GDP per worker.   
Assumption (7) allows for the use of suitably lagged levels of the variables as 
instruments for Equation (6) (e.g, Arellano and Bond, 1991). The use of instruments is 
required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables in the 
first-differenced equation and also the problem that by construction the new error term, 
(  , −   ,   ) is correlated with the lagged dependent variable [log(      ,   ) −
log(      ,   )]. 
As noted earlier, the difference-GMM estimator has been shown to have poor finite 
sample properties (bias and imprecision) when the lagged levels of the series are only 
weakly correlated with subsequent first differences, so that the instruments available for 
the first-differenced equations are weak (see Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000). This issue 
is said to arise when the marginal processes for the explanatory variables could be 
highly persistent. This instrument weakness influences the asymptotic and small-sample 
performance of the difference estimator. Indeed, in a small sample Monte Carlo 
experiment, Arellano and Bover (1995) showed that the weakness of the level 
instruments can produce biased coefficients in a differenced equation.  
To reduce the potential bias and imprecision associated with the usual difference 
estimator, we utilise the new estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and later reviewed and corroborated in Blundell and Bond 
(2000) and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000). The extended system GMM 
combines in a system the regression in differences (Equation 6) with the regression in 
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levels (Equation 5). The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as 
above. The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the 
corresponding variables. According to Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000), the joint 
stationarity of the dependent and independent processes is sufficient (but not necessary) 
for the validity of the additional moment restrictions for the equations in levels.  
The stationarity property can be stated as follows: 
 
E[log(      ,   ) |  ] = E[log(      ,   ) |  ] and E[  ,   |  ] = E[  ,   
|  ].  (8) 
 
Therefore, the additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are: 
 
E[log(      ,   ) − log(       ,     ) |(  +   , )] = 0 for s = 1.     (9) 
 
E[  ,   −   ,     |(  +   , )] = 0 for s = 1.       (10) 
 
Overall, we use the moment conditions presented in Equations (7), (8) (9), and (10) 
and employ the extended sys-GMM procedure to generate consistent and efficient 
parameter estimates for equations (5) and (6). As noted earlier, we estimate these models 
using annual data and data for non-overlapping 3-year periods. We allow for richer 
dynamics in the empirical models based on the annual data. However, given that yearly 
data often contain series that are not close to their steady states throughout the study 
period - a virtue that biases the sys-GMM estimator - we instead utilised an averaged 
non-overlapping data to reduce the tendency of the series to deviate from their steady 
states and as such control the potential bias of the sys-GMM. Similarly, time dummies 
were also used to control for business cycle influences10.  
Lastly, consistency of the sys-GMM estimator is known to depend on the validity of 
the instruments. So, to prove the validity of our instruments, we consider two 
specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). The first is a Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample 
analogue of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The second test 
examines the hypothesis that the error term   ,  is not serially correlated. By 
construction, the differenced error term is probably first-order serially correlated even if 
the original error term is not. The consistency of the sys-GMM however only depends 
on the error term being uncorrelated at the second-order. Furthermore, the GMM 
estimator is also known to be more efficient than the simple instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator if heteroskedasticity is present in a model with endogenous regressors (e.g 
 
10 The use of time-dummies is particularly important since, as noted by Roodman (2009), including them 
in the equation will make the assumption of no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances 
likely to hold. 
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Baum, 2006). So, to ascertain whether GMM is even appropriate we first test for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the model. We apply the heteroscedasticity test 
proposed by Pagan and Hall (1983) - e.g, the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg 
and White/Koenker statistic - on the OLS regression of Equation (5). The results of our 
empirical analysis and the diagnostics are discussed in the next section.  
 
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of our empirical analysis that were obtained from a 
range of estimators. Table 4 contains the results for the annual estimates while Table 5 
report the results for the non-overlapping 3-year panel. For this study, we will focus on 
the result from the one-step system-gmm, for which inference based on the asymptotic 
variance matrix has been shown to be more reliable than for the (asymptotically) more 
efficient two-step estimator (e.g, Imbens, 1997). The first three columns of Table 4 and 
5 report the results obtained using OLS, within-group and differenced-gmm estimators. 
The one-step system-GMM result and its two-step counterpart are reported in the last 
two columns respectively.  
We take the impact multiplier of a change in        ,  to be   
and that of 
       , to be   . 
The effect after one period is derived from    +    and 
   +   . The long-run (equilibrium) multipliers are   = (  +   )/(1 −  )  and 
  = (  +   )/(1 −  )  and the adjustment speed is calculated as (1 −  )%. We 
expect, in line with the observations by Bond (2002), the OLS estimator to produce an 
upward-biased estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable and the 
within-group estimator to produce a downward-biased estimate of this coefficient in the 
presence of group-specific effects. As a result, the true adjustment speed should lie 
above the OLS estimate and below the within-group estimates if there are evidence of 
group-specific effects.  
We begin by first discussing the results of some preliminary tests. As mentioned 
earlier, GMM is said to be appropriate, compared to traditional IV estimators, only    
in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Applying the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
heteroscedasticity test on the OLS regression of Equation (5) - both the annual and 
3-yearly averaged series - we easily reject the null of constant variance for the regression 
residuals (see results in Table 3 below). This finding implies that the GMM estimator 
will be more efficient than the simple instrumental variable (IV) for our analysis.  
Next, from the results of the annual estimates presented in Table 4 below we find 
that the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in the one-step 
system-GMM, as expected, lies below the OLS and above the within group estimates. 
Furthermore, performing a Wald coefficient restriction test on the OLS estimate of  , 
we easily reject the hypothesis that  = 1. Similarly, we reject the hypothesis that  , 
from the within-group estimate is equal to zero. These results confirm the consistency of 
the bounds provided by the OLS and the within-group estimates. 
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Table 3.  Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Annual Series Result Averaged Series Result 
chi2(1) 22.860 chi2(1) 3.450 
Prob > chi2 0.00 Prob > chi2 0.063 
Source: Based on the author's own calculation 
Notes: Variables fitted are the values of log(     ). H : Constant variance 
 
 
The tests of the validity of the instruments in the annual regression, as expected, 
produces several suspect statistic that imply the annual regression results need to be 
interpreted with caution. For example, the Hansen tests of instrument overidentification, 
including the diff-in-Hansen test of the additional instrument restriction in the 
system-GMM, produced p-values of 1.00. And as Roodman (2009) noted, a perfect 
Hansen statistic of 1.00 is a tell-tale sign of instrument proliferation and model 
misspecification: proliferation of instruments results in the overfitting of the endogenous 
variables as well as in the inability of the instruments to expunge the variables’ 
endogenous components. These issues tend to weaken the power of the Hansen tests to 
detect the validity of the system-GMM instruments. So, given that the validity of the 
instruments is key for the reliability of the GMM estimator, the inconsistency of the 
instrument tests therefore means the results of the annual series regression should be 
disregarded. 
Furthermore, given that the system-GMM require entities sampled to be close to 
their steady states throughout the study period (e.g Roodman, 2009), we suspect that by 
allowing for richer dynamics in the panel data through the use of longer time series that 
we could have possibly violated this assumption. This is because, as we have explained 
earlier, longer time series often include periods when individuals could be too far from 
their steady states. The perfect Hansen statistic of 1.00 certainly point to the possibility 
of a violation of the steady state assumption.  
By averaging the variables, we hoped to produce individual samples that will not be 
too far from their steady states. This is important because, as mentioned before, the 
validity of the system-GMM depends on the assumption that changes in the 
instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects: that is, they require that 
throughout the study period, individuals sampled are not too far from their long-run 
means. We find, expectedly, that the Sargan and Hansen tests, including the 
diff-in-Hansen test, produced valid test statistic for the averaged panel. Despite the 
Sargan test rejecting the validity of the instruments used in both the one-step and 
two-step system-GMM, the consistency of the instruments is not undermined because 
there is evidence (e.g Blundell and Bond, 2000) of the increased power of the Sargan 
test to over-reject the instruments used in the system-GMM. The Difference-in-Hansen 
statistic that specifically tests the additional moment conditions used in the 
system-GMM equations accepts the validity of our instruments. Also, the null of no 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals is easily accepted for the one-step 
system-GMM. 
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Table 4.  Regression Results from the Annual Panel (a),(b) 







log(      ,   ) 0.958*** 0.935*** 0.892*** 0.958*** 0.968** 
  (0.007) (0.014) (0.024) (0.008) (0.353) 
log(       , ) 0.209*** 0.225*** 0.194*** 0.209*** 0.092 
  (0.039) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.310) 
log	(       ,   ) -0.186*** -0.194*** -0.166*** -0.186*** -0.286 
  (0.036) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.174) 
log(       , ) 0.014 0.027 0.019 0.014 0.079 
  (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.241) 
log(       , ) -0.016 -0.012 -0.004 -0.016 -0.012 
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.192) 
     ,    0.005** 0.005*** 0.003 0.005 0.028 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.029) 
Constant 0.270*** 0.332*** 
 
0.00 1.714 
  (0.066) (0.049) 
 
(0.00) (3.702) 
m(1) (c) 1.120 - -2.680 -2.630 -1.540 
  [0.265] - [0.007] [0.009] [0.124] 
m(2) (c) 1.060 - 0.020 -0.010 0.520 
  [0.290] - [0.986] [0.993] [0.602] 
Sargan (d) - - 0.093 0.036 0.036 
Hansen (e) - - 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Diff-in-Hansen (f) - - - 1.00 1.00 
Observations 643 643 612 643 643 
R-squared 0.996 0.990 - - - 
Number of id 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of instruments - - 612 643 643 
Wald test ( = 1 and  = 0) 0.00 0.00 - - - 
Notes: (a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (b) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (c) m(1) and m(2) are 
the Arellano-Bond test for first-order and second-order serial correlation. The p-values for the null of no 
serial correlation are reported in square brackets. (d.) Sargan tests the validity of instrument overidentification. 
This test is not robust, but not weakened by many instruments. Only the p-values for the null hypothesis of 
valid instrument are reported. (e) Hansen also tests the validity of instrument overidentification. This test is 
robust, but weakened by many instruments. Only the p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instrument are 
reported. (f) Diff-in-Hansen tests the additional instruments used by the sys-GMM estimator. Only the 
p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instrument is reported.  
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Table 5.  Regression Results from the non-Overlapping 3-year Panel (a),(b) 







log(      ,   ) 0.906*** 0.844*** 0.920*** 0.892*** 0.871*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.091) (0.055) (0.050) 
log(       , ) 0.210*** 0.171*** 0.099 0.176*** 0.161** 
  (0.031) (0.026) (0.062) (0.037) (0.059) 
log	(       ,   ) -0.157*** -0.078** -0.090 -0.124*** -0.100* 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.053) (0.044) (0.049) 
log(       , ) 0.080*** 0.097*** 0.113** 0.052 0.068** 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.049) (0.036) (0.027) 
log(       , ) -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.116** -0.086* -0.089*** 
  (0.024) (0.020) (0.049) (0.044) (0.027) 
     ,    0.007 0.003 0.032 0.041** 0.031*** 
  (0.005) (0.017) (0.037) (0.017) (0.010) 
Constant 0.610*** 0.766*** - - - 
  (0.118) (0.051) - - - 
m(1) (c) 4.380 - -2.560 -2.840 -2.770 
  [0.00] - [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] 
m(2) (c) 2.430 - 0.220 -0.100 0.00 
  [0.015] - [0.825] [0.921] [0.997] 
Sargan (d) - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen (e) - - 0.800 0.765 0.765 
Diff-in-Hansen (f) - - - 0.571 0.571 
Observations 325 325 294 325 325 
R-squared 0.994 0.993 - - - 
Number of id 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of instruments - - 45 49 49 
Wald test ( = 1 and  = 0) 0.00 0.00 - - - 
Notes: (a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (b) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (c) m(1) and m(2) are 
the Arellano-Bond test for first-order and second-order serial correlation. The p-values for the null of no 
serial correlation are reported in square brackets. (d.) Sargan tests the validity of instrument overidentification. 
This test is not robust, but not weakened by many instruments. Only the p-values for the null hypothesis of 
valid instrument are reported. (e) Hansen also tests the validity of instrument overidentification. This test is 
robust, but weakened by many instruments. Only the p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instrument are 
reported. (f) Diff-in-Hansen tests the additional instruments used by the sys-GMM estimator. Only the 
p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instrument is reported.  
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Furthermore, performing a Wald coefficient restriction test on the OLS estimate of 
 , we easily reject the hypothesis that  = 1. Similarly, we reject the hypothesis that  , 
from the within-group estimate is equal to zero. These results confirm likewise the 
consistency of the bounds provided by the OLS and the within-group estimates of the 
averaged series. 
Overall, the one-step system-GMM parameter estimates for the non-overlapping 
3-year average model appear to be reasonable, although the estimated coefficient of 
log(       , 
) is statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is higher than the within-group estimate and lower than the OLS 
estimate. The result point to an adjustment speed of 11%. Furthermore, the result 
indicate that capital accumulation has a significant positive effect on the steady-state 
level of output per worker (of around 0.48), even after controlling for unobserved 
country-specific effects and allowing for the likely endogeneity of investment. We also 
find that the level of effectiveness of institutions does have a significant impact on the 
level of output produced by a worker. Our analysis, however, show that nominal gross 
expenditure on R&D does not have a contemporaneous positive effect on gross domestic 
output per worker, but a significant negative effect in the long term. Such result is hard 
to interpret. Fortunately, due to the lack of theoretical support for a direct relationship 
between institutional quality and output growth and the possibility of multicollinearity 
bias in the model when the institutional variable is simultaneously included with the 
R&D variable, we decided to reparametrize our methodology to include the institution 
proxy as an indirect control variable in the model. 
We experimented by including the institution proxy - the rule of law - first as an 
exogenous instrument only (Model 1). We also re-estimated the model with the 
institutional proxy as an interaction term with the R&D variable (Model 2) as well as a 
dummy regressor in the main equation (Model 3). To derive an institutional dummy, we 
classified all rule of law observations less than the panel median value as 0 and above as 
1. We also examined the effect of the institutional dummy as an interaction term with 
the R&D variable (Model 4). Lastly, we analysed a model with the institutional dummy 
as an exogenous instrument only (Model 5). The models with the interaction terms 
(Models 2 and 4) allows us to measure the effect of R&D on output given the level of 
institutional quality. The results of these analyses are presented in the table below. 
The results in the table above indicate that the models with institutional proxies 
(     and the      	counterpart) as exogenous instrumental variables (that is Models 
1 and 5 respectively) had some improvement in the R&D coefficients; both now have a 
significant positive long-run effect. For Model 1, the contemporaneous impact of 
log	(    ) on output per worker is 0.10 while the long run impact is around one half of 
the immediate impact (0.053). When the institutional proxy is converted into a dummy 
and used as an instrument in the model, the contemporaneous impact of the R&D 
variable on output remained relatively the same (at 0.108). However, the long-run 
equivalent is relatively higher, at 0.097.  
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Table 6.  Reparametrized Models (a),(b) 
Variables 
One-step sys-GMM Models (g) 
1 2 3 4 5 
log(      ,   ) 0.868*** 0.733*** 0.810*** 0.819*** 0.857*** 
 (0.031) (0.102) (0.079) (0.080) (0.037) 
log(       , ) 0.205*** 0.156* 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.207*** 
 (0.041) (0.083) (0.054) (0.052) (0.045) 
log	(       ,   ) -0.120*** -0.101* -0.093 -0.095* -0.122** 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) (0.045) 
log(       , ) 0.100*** 0.122* 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 
 (0.030) (0.061) (0.050) (0.049) (0.030) 
log(       , ) -0.093*** -0.103* -0.144*** -0.139*** -0.094*** 
(0.029) (0.055) (0.042) (0.039) (0.028) 
log(       , )#     , −1  0.010**    
  (0.005)    
        0.069**   
    (0.031)   
      # log(       , )    0.00  
     (0.00)  
      # log(       , )    0.008**  
       (0.004)   
m(1) (c) -2.900 -2.230 -2.720 -2.710 -2.860 
  [0.004] [0.026] [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] 
m(2) (c) -0.200 -0.020 0.090 0.050 -0.230 
  [0.838] [0.986] [0.926] [0.957] [0.822] 
Sargan (d) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen (e) 0.896 0.865 0.983 0.973 0.904 
Diff-in-Hansen (f) 0.797 0.120 0.634 0.687 0.809 
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 
Number of id 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of instruments 49 48 48 48 49 
Notes: (a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (b) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (c) m(1) and m(2) are 
the Arellano-Bond test for first-order and second-order serial correlation. The p-values for the null of no 
serial correlation are reported in square brackets. (d.) Sargan tests the validity of instrument overidentification. 
This test is not robust, but not weakened by many instruments. Only the p-values for the null hypothesis of 
valid instrument are reported. (e) Hansen also tests the validity of instrument overidentification. This test is 
robust, but weakened by many instruments. Only the p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instrument are 
reported. (f) Diff-in-Hansen tests the additional instruments used by the sys-GMM estimator. Only the 
p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instrument is reported. (g) Model 1 included rule as an exogenous 
instrument only; Model 2 included lagged rule as an interaction term with the R&D variable; Model 3 
included rule transformed as a dummy. With rule observations less than the median classified as 0 and above 
as 1; Model 4 included the rule dummy as an interaction term instead; Model 5 included the rule dummy as 
an exogenous instrument only. 
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The interaction models (2 and 4) allowed us to measure the marginal impact that 
derives from having effective institutions. We experimented by interacting the R&D 
variable with both the continuous institutional variable (    ) and the factor       
counterpart. The use of dummy allows us to perform some specific analyses that are not 
possible with continuous variables. To begin with, in the case of Model 2, we see that 
for every unit change in the R&D variable, output, on average, will synchronously 
increase by 0.122. However, the increase is larger for countries with better institutional 
arrangement. Such will see a synchronous increase of around 0.132. In Model 4 with the 
dummy variable, the contemporaneous impact increases by around 6%, from 0.136 to 
0.144 for countries with superior institutional arrangement. When we included the 
institutional dummy as an independent regressor in the model (Model 3), we observed 
that having a more effective institution increases the contemporaneous impact of R&D 
expenditure on output from 0.141 to 0.210. The key point here is that, in all cases, 
increasing R&D expenditure leads to significant marginal increases in output per worker 
when there exists effective institutional arrangement. 
   
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation  
 
Figure 1.  Marginal Effect from     	Interaction 
 
 
Our results underscore the strategic relevance of institutional quality. From Figures 1 
and 2, it is obvious that the average marginal effect of R&D expenditure on output 
growth is significantly higher in countries with higher institutional quality than in 
countries with lower institutional quality. In fact, we see that the predicted intercepts are 
significantly different for the two broad categories (Figures 3). 
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Source: Author’s own calculation  
 




Source: Author’s own calculation  
 
Figure 3.  Predictive Margins from       Interaction   
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Overall, according to our results, the major source of output growth is increased 
productivity deriving from improvements in the quality of human and physical capital 
and human interaction that are the product of purposeful investment in the productive 
assets of the economy, on research and development and, more importantly, the level of 
institutional effectiveness. The productive assets, such as land, plant, machinery, and 
equipment, good road, railway, seaport, and airport networks, as well as adequate school, 
office, hospital, private residential/commercial buildings, and IT infrastructures are 
fundamental for growth. However, in the presence of effective institutions, R&D 
investments complement, through their applied outcomes, the improvements in the 
quality of both human and physical capital, which in turn drives productivity cum output 
growth. From a micro-perspective, effective institutions incentivise the pursuit of 
discoveries and allow for their implementation. In turn, the application of the new 
knowledge led to process, product and organisational innovations that increases the 
possibility of monopoly rents that subsequently incentivises firms to increase investment 
in complementary physical and human capital as well as in further R&D, which in turn 
leads to increased productivity and output as well as an increase income. This endless 
cycle of accumulation, with the reinforcing growth-loop, is what we contend that 
determines the performance of the economy in the long-run.  
 
 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The main purpose of this study is to provide a consistent empirical analysis of an 
endogenous growth process. We built upon the Schumpeterian endogenous growth 
theory originally proposed by Aghion and Howitt (1998a, 1998b) by considering the 
effect of institutional arrangement on the growth process. We started by showing that 
despite the tremendous progress that has been made in the theoretical modelling of 
endogenous growth, little progress has been achieved with regards the provision of 
consistent empirical support. The inconsistencies of past empirical studies, we 
highlighted, emanate from the vulnerability of traditional estimators that do not address 
the potential problems posed by the endogeneity bias arising from variable measurement 
errors as well as the omission of a relevant institution proxy. Using a panel data 
consisting of 31 OECD countries from 1981 to 2017, we proceeded to provide a robust 
empirical estimate for an augmented-Schumpeterian endogenous growth theory.  
Based on the empirical results, we observed that there is indeed an infinite-sample 
bias, due to instrument proliferation, when the system-GMM estimator is used to analyse 
variables that are not close to their steady states. However, using a 3-year averaged 
panel that addresses the infinite-sample problem, we find, from the consistent one-step 
system-GMM estimation, that capital accumulation and purposive R&D expenditure 
does certainly affect output in the long term, especially when the latter is done in a 
hospitable environment that promotes cooperative and innovative solutions to complex 
human exchanges.    
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A few policy implications that can be drawn from our results are as follows: (i) 
Given the significant role capital accumulation plays in determining the level of output 
per worker in the long-run, constraints, such as inadequate human and physical capital - 
in the form of poor education, healthcare system, road and other distribution networks, 
electricity and other infrastructural amenities - are more likely to undermine economic 
growth in the long term. As such, the government needs to implement policies that 
tackles these deficiencies if they are keen on stimulating long-run economic growth. (ii) 
Given that institutions affect the performance of an economy by their effect on 
incentives and the cost of exchange and production, their ought to be a collective effort 
in ensuring the evolution of effective institutions that create a hospitable environment 
for cooperative and innovative solutions to complex human exchange. (iii) Policies to 
boost R&D, such as subsidies to business R&D and government involvement in R&D 
activities that are risky and expensive for businesses to undertake, are equally vital for 
the growth of income per capita in the long run. 
Lastly, although we have attempted to account in our analysis the macroeconomic 
impact of institutions, there is still a lot to be done in this regard because the manner in 
which the institutional quality proxy we utilised in our analysis is measured leaves a lot 
of questions unanswered. For starters, the institutional quality proxy utilised in this study 
is based on the outcome of the surveys of foreign and domestic investors, in which the 
respondents subjectively rate the quality of institutional arrangement in their resident 
country. So, the proxy reflects investors’ personal opinions, rather than any formal 
aspects of the relevant institutional setting. The problem with this is that we cannot 
explicitly pinpoint, although we can broadly show that institutions matter, the specific 
rules, legislation, or institutional design - whether formal or informal - that is actually 
responsible for the institutional outcome been measured. Therefore, a major task for 
growth economists going forward is to develop a consistent framework that can enable 








A1.  Variables Definition and Sources 
 
1.  Variable: GDP 
 
- Indicator name: GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
- Long definition: GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
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depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the 
official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign 
exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. 
- Source: OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
2.  Variable: Gfcf 
 
- Indicator name: Gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 US$) 
- Long definition: Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) 
consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in 
the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, 
and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchase; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, 
and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms 
to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in 
progress." This is according to the 1993 SNA; net acquisitions of valuables are also 
considered capital formation. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. 
- Source: OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
3.  Variable: Employment 
 
- Indicator name: Employment Figure 
- Long definition: Employed people are those aged 15 or over who report that they 
have worked in gainful employment for at least one hour in the previous week or who 
had a job but were absent from work during the reference week. The working age 
population refers to people aged 15 to 64. This indicator is seasonally adjusted and it is 
measured in terms of thousand persons aged 15 and over. 
- Source: OECD statistical database. 
 
4.  Variable: Gerd 
 
- Indicator name: Gross expenditure on R&D (constant 2005 US$) 
- Long definition: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) is total intramural 
expenditure on R&D performed in the national territory during a specific reference 
period. 
- Source: OECD statistical database. 
 
5.  Variable: Rule 
 
- Indicator name: Rule of Law: Estimate 
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- Long definition: Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
- Source: Detailed documentation of the World Governance Indicators (WGI), 
interactive tools for exploring the data, and full access to the underlying source data are 
available at www.govindicators.org. The WGI are produced by Daniel Kaufmann 
(Natural Resource Governance Institute and Brookings Institution) and Aart Kraay 
(World Bank Development Research Group). Citation: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. 
Mastruzzi (2010). “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical 
Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. 
 
 
A2.  List of Countries 
 
S/N Country ID S/N Country ID S/N Country ID 
1 Mexico MEX 11 Czech Republic CZE 21 Norway NOR 
2 Turkey TUR 12 Italy ITA 22 Korea Republic KOR 
3 Poland POL 13 Slovenia SVN 23 Austria AUT 
4 Slovak Republic SVK 14 Ireland IRL 24 Denmark DNK 
5 Greece GRC 15 United Kingdom GBR 25 Germany DEU 
6 Hungary HUN 16 Canada CAN 26 Japan JPN 
7 Estonia EST 17 Australia AUS 27 Finland FIN 
8 Portugal PRT 18 Belgium BEL 28 Israel  ISR 
9 Spain ESP 19 France FRA 29 United States USA 
10 New Zealand NZL 20 Netherlands NLD 30 Switzerland CHE 
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